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Abstract—Differential privacy protects an individual’s privacy
by perturbing data on an aggregated level (DP) or individual level
(LDP). We report four online human-subject experiments inves-
tigating the effects of using different approaches to communicate
differential privacy techniques to laypersons in a health app data
collection setting. Experiments 1 and 2 investigated participants’
data disclosure decisions for low-sensitive and high-sensitive per-
sonal information when given different DP or LDP descriptions.
Experiments 3 and 4 uncovered reasons behind participants’
data sharing decisions, and examined participants’ subjective
and objective comprehensions of these DP or LDP descriptions.
When shown descriptions that explain the implications instead
of the definition/processes of DP or LDP technique, participants
demonstrated better comprehension and showed more willingness
to share information with LDP than with DP, indicating their
understanding of LDP’s stronger privacy guarantee compared
with DP.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation and ubiquitousness of pervasive comput-
ing has brought an unprecedented amount of collection and
analysis of personal information. While such data can be
used for personal and societal benefit, improving sustainability,
public health, etc., they can also be used in undesired and un-
expected ways. These usages can cause adverse consequences
for data participants’ reputation, insurability, etc., leading to
hosts of privacy concerns. People distrust current tools [33],
and utilize a variety of measures to protect privacy [26],
[38], such as withholding personal information or deliberately
providing false personal information, which is detrimental to
the utility of the collected data.
To protect data privacy and ensure utility in the context
of data publishing, the concept of differential privacy (DP)
has been proposed [14], which adds noise to the aggregated
result such that the amount of revealed information for any
individual is bounded. DP techniques have been deployed by
government agencies such as the US Census Bureau for the
2020 census [1]. In recent years, local differential privacy
(LDP) has been proposed. LDP differs from DP in that random
noise is added at an individual user level before sending the
data to the server. Thus, under LDP users do not need to
rely on the trustworthiness of the company or the server.
LDP has been deployed by companies such as Google [17],
Apple [4], and Microsoft [13]. With the increasing deployment
of DP and LDP techniques, an interesting and important open
question is whether users understand these techniques, trust
them, and, consequently, increase their data disclosure when
these techniques are deployed.
Our work takes a step towards understanding how to ef-
fectively communicate DP and LDP techniques in order to
facilitate users’ data disclosure decisions. Centering on textual
descriptions of differential privacy techniques, we set out to
answer the following five research questions (RQs):
• RQ 1: Will participants increase their data disclosure,
especially for high-sensitive information, when informed
that DP or LDP techniques have been deployed?
• RQ 2: To what extent will participants’ data disclosure
decisions depend on how the privacy techniques are commu-
nicated, e.g., descriptions focus on definition or implication?
• RQ 3: What factors caused participants to decide whether
or not to share their personal information when given
description(s) of differential privacy?
• RQ 4: Do participants feel that they understand the de-
scription(s)? Moreover, which part(s) of the description(s)
is difficult for them to understand?
• RQ 5: In which ways are participants’ objective compre-
hension of DP and LDP affected by how the techniques are
described?
RQ1 and RQ2 are about users’ data sharing decisions when
informed that DP and LDP techniques have been deployed. To
address them, we conducted Experiments 1 and 2, in which
participants made hypothetical data disclosure decisions in a
health app survey setting (see Fig. 1). Participants were asked
to imagine that they just installed the health app, which needs
to collect personal information from them. They were then
shown 14 questions asking for personal information, among
which half are considered high-sensitive, and the other half
are low-sensitive. We varied the presence and absence, as well
as the ways of describing privacy techniques.
We ask RQ3, RQ4, and RQ5 to understand the reasons
behind users’ data sharing decisions. To address RQ3 and
RQ4, we conducted an open-question survey in Experiment
3. The procedure was similar to prior experiments; however,
participants made only one high-sensitive data disclosure de-
cision. Following the data disclosure decision, we asked each
participant to explain why they decided to share or not share
their personal information. Participants also rated whether the
given differential privacy description was easy to comprehend.
For participants who indicated the description was not easy to
understand, we asked them to highlight the part or parts that
were difficult to comprehend. We conducted Experiment 4 to
assess participants’ objective comprehension of DP and LDP
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Fig. 1: Flow chart shows the experimental design for experiments of
data sharing decisions (Group 1). Pilot Study 1 validated the health
app data collection setting. Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B addressed
RQ1 and RQ2. “Instructions” box presents the conditions in all
experiments. “Health App Survey” box lists the seven low-sensitive
and the seven high-sensitive questions.
(RQ5). Based on lessons learned from previous experiments,
we also added new descriptions for each technique that explain
data flow and implication inferences. Participants were shown
descriptions of DP or LDP, then answered five questions
about the privacy and utility consequences. We compared the
correct answer rates of those questions between the two new
descriptions and descriptions from prior experiments.
DP and LDP are typically used in different settings. Each
participant in our study was exposed to only one of them.
In terms of privacy, LDP provides stronger protection than
DP does, because LDP does not need to trust the server. Our
experimental setting (the health app data collection testbed, see
Section III-C) also focused on the privacy protection provided
by the techniques to minimize other confound factors in the
experiment design. In this case, we expect a higher data
disclosure rate under LDP. When that did not happen, it could
be an indicator that many participants do not really understand
the nature of protection from the descriptions. We obtained
answers for each question as follows:
RQ1: Data Sharing under Differential Privacy. Participants
increased data sharing for the high-sensitive questions when
they were informed of protection from differential privacy, in-
dicating a positive effect of communicating privacy techniques.
RQ2: Data Sharing with Different Descriptions. When
descriptions focused on definition and/or data perturbation
processes, participates’ data sharing rates were not larger
for LDP than for DP. Nevertheless, higher data disclosure
rates were obtained for the LDP conditions than for the DP
condition when the implications were communicated, i.e.,
whether the privacy protection relies on the trustworthiness
of the company or the server.
RQ3: Reasons behind Sharing Decisions. About half of
the participants chose to share their personal information.
Most of them explained that they made the decision because
of the described privacy protection, suggesting that trust in
privacy protection techniques led to the decisions to share.
Participants who decided not to share cited various concerns,
top three of which are 1) the requested information are too
sensitive to share, 2) distrust of the described differential
privacy techniques, and 3) risks of data breach in the future.
RQ4: Subjective Measure of Comprehension. Only 13% of
the participants indicated that they had difficulty in understand-
ing the described techniques, and the difficult parts mentioned
the most were about the data perturbation processes.
RQ5: Objective Measures of Comprehension. Better com-
prehension results were obtained for descriptions that provide
implication inferences than those which do not.
Finally, we discuss how the obtained results inform our
understanding of effective differential privacy communication
and highlight implications of our findings in Section VIII.
To summarize, our work makes the following contributions:
• We provide quantitative and qualitative evidence showing
benefits (increasing data sharing) of communicating differ-
ential privacy to users.
• We identify the data perturbation processes as the most
difficult parts for laypeople to understand and provide
evidence showing implication descriptions as one effective
way (i.e., larger data disclosure rates and better objective
comprehension results) for DP and LDP communication.
• We further uncover the effect of implication descriptions on
comprehending differential privacy with data flow descrip-
tions which afford privacy and utility implication inferences.
• We reveal a robust effect of information sensitivity in
participants’ data disclosure decisions even with privacy-
enhancing techniques, suggesting biased responses within
non-mandatory data collecting.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Background on Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy [15] applies in the setting where there
is a trusted data curator, who gathers data from individual
users, processes the data in a way that satisfies DP, and then
publishes the results.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). An algorithm A satisfies
-DP, where  ≥ 0, if and only if for any two datasets D and
D′ that differ in at most one record, and any set R of possible
outputs of A, we have
Pr [A(D) ∈ R] ≤ e Pr [A(D′) ∈ R]
The definition prevents a strong adversary who knows all
but one record in the database from inferring the last one after
seeing the output. To ensure that, A first obtains the true result
from D, and then adds noise to the result.
In the local setting, each user perturbs the input value v
using an algorithm A and reports A(v) to the aggregator.
Definition 2 (Local Differential Privacy). An algorithm A(·)
satisfies -local differential privacy (-LDP), where  ≥ 0, if
and only if for any input v, v′, and any set R of possible
outputs of A, we have
Pr [A(v) ∈ R] ≤ e Pr [A(v′) ∈ R]
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In both DP and LDP,  plays an important role as it measures
the randomness of the process. A large  leads to insufficient
noise, which does not provide much privacy protection.
Difference between DP and LDP. In DP, the server has
access to the true sensitive values of the users, while in
LDP, the aggregator does not see the actual private data of
each individual. Instead, users send randomized information
to the aggregator, who infers the data distribution based on
that. However, the better trust model also comes at the cost
of utility: with the same privacy guarantee, measured by the
parameter , the utility of LDP is worse than DP by a factor
of Θ(
√
n) [10], where n is the number of users.
Deployment of DP and LDP. Although DP was proposed
more than a decade ago, the first public deployments of this
concept are related to LDP, e.g., companies like Apple [4],
Google [17], and Microsoft [13]. Exemplary use cases include
collecting users’ default browser homepage and search engine
to understand the unwanted or malicious hijacking of user
settings; or gathering frequently typed emojis and words to
help predict keyboard typing.
More recently, DP is also deployed in both industry and gov-
ernment. In particular, Uber released an open-source project
for SQL query with differential privacy [24]; LinkedIn pro-
posed a system to analyze user information with DP [29];
the US Census Bureau has deployed DP technologies for the
2020 census [1]; and Harvard built a system prototype for
researchers to share data using DP [19].
With the deployments of DP and LDP, we started seeing
companies and organizations begin to communicate DP and
LDP techniques to the public, including Apple, Google, Mi-
crosoft, Uber, and US Census Bureau. We took descriptions
from the companies and organizations mentioned above, made
minor modifications to fit our context, and used them in our
experiments.
B. Related Work
Usability of DP and LDP. One primary goal of addressing
the RQs is to achieve “usable differential privacy”. The most
closely related prior work is Bullek et al. [8], which studied
people’s comprehension of the random response method [45]
for LDP and preference of the privacy parameter. In that study,
each participant perturbed answers for sensitive questions with
three probabilities, corresponding to three  values. For a
final high-sensitive question, participants were asked to first
choose the perturbation probability and then answer. 75% of
the participants chose the largest perturbation (which obscured
their true answers the most), 5% chose the intermediate one,
and 20% chose the least perturbation. Subjective reasons
provided for selecting the least protection focused on a desire
to respond truthfully. One interpretation of these results is that
most people want strong privacy protection, but a cognitive
bias to equate such data perturbation with “lying” (data-
obfuscation) can sway privacy-related decisions.
Our work is orthogonal to [8]. Instead of focusing on the
parameter value, we strive to convey the qualitative nature of
differential privacy. We study people’s willingness to share
personal information when given different descriptions of DP
or LDP, and the reasons behind those decisions. While the
privacy parameter  critically affects the level of privacy
protection, it seems unlikely that end users can choose  based
on understanding how the mechanism works and assess the
impacts of different  values. It is more likely that they will
rely on expert assessment of the appropriateness of deployed 
values, and accessible explanations of the consequences. This
is similar to how privacy policies are used. In practice, people
are not reading privacy policies because they are long and
full of legalese [32]. At the same time, when a company’s
privacy policies and practices are inadequate, this will often
be discovered by experts, and lawsuits may ensure [9], [34].
Usability of Privacy Notices. A large body of work has
been conducted to inform users about privacy techniques [27],
[28] and to facilitate their privacy decisions [20], [42]. For
example, when privacy policies of online shopping sites were
made more prominent and accessible within a shopping search
engine interface, participants increased their purchase intention
with the sites offering better privacy protection [42].
To improve the usability of privacy from the user’s per-
spective, “privacy by control” through notice and choice
have become essential for privacy protection [39]. Notice
and consent as a principle is widely recognized by law and
society. For example, companies such as Google and Apple
have implemented permission dialogs in Android and iOS
to request access to hardware and data from users. Felt and
colleagues [18] investigated the effectiveness of the Android
permission system in warning users of app installation risks.
Their results showed that most participants did not pay atten-
tion to permission warnings or did not understand what the
permissions mean. Lin et al. [31] examined permission warn-
ings in helping participants manage the privacy of installed
apps. Their results showed that designs that highlight privacy
implications, e.g., unexpected data collection practices, were
effective in helping participants avoid intrusive apps.
The communication of DP or LDP also deals with the
usability of privacy notice. But it has a unique challenge
because of its mathematical complexity. Thus, we start from
definitions and explore how to remove the technical details
while preserving the fidelity of the communication.
Decision Making of Online Data Sharing. Our study centers
on people’s data sharing decisions, which are affected by
various factors. People’s decision making in risk contexts are
influenced by how a problem is framed [43], [44]. Specifically,
if the outcomes are described in terms of potential loss
(negative framing), people are risk-seeking. However, people
are risk-averse when the outcomes are presented in terms of
potential gains (positive framing).
A different way of establishing a frame of reference involves
emphasis framing, which accentuates a subset of potentially
relevant considerations [16]. For example, the consequence
of online data sharing can be framed positively in terms
of free product and service, or negatively in terms of loss
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due to privacy concerns. While some prior studies provided
evidence that the emphasis framing influenced people’s privacy
decisions [3], some did not [21], requiring further research. A
scrutiny of the prior studies revealed differences on informa-
tion sensitivity level. While highly intrusive information, such
as drug use, was asked in [3], most information examined
in [21], such as height and time of exercise, were less sensitive.
Privacy issues arise in the specific contexts [11], [35], [36].
Prior studies revealed that many health apps had privacy risks
to users [12], [23], and caused low engagement of users due to
privacy concern [30], [41]. So we chose a health app survey
setting as the testbed to evaluate participants’ data sharing
decisions in the current study. While DP provides better utility,
we note that this is mainly beneficial to the server, rather
than the users. LDP provides better privacy promise than DP
does in the health app data sharing context, which would be
preferred by users [8]. We also varied the sensitivity level of
the health information across survey questions and evaluated
the effect of a negative framing in terms of privacy risk or
a positive framing in terms of benefit on participants’ data-
sharing decisions.
III. OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENT DESIGN
We ran a series of online experiments, which can be
divided into two groups. Experiments in Group 1 (including
Pilot Study 1 and Experiments 1, 2A, 2B) focus on decision
measures of whether participants were willing to share their
personal information under different conditions. Experiments
in Group 2 (including Experiments 3, Pilot Study 2, and
Experiment 4) focus on more in-depth understanding of the
reasons behind participants’ data sharing decisions and their
comprehension of DP and LDP. We ran multiple studies in part
because findings in earlier studies led to interesting questions
that we sought to answer with additional studies.
In this section, we describe the method of participant
recruitment, design of differential privacy descriptions, and the
testbed of health app data collection. Experiments in Group 1
all used the same procedure, which is described in Section IV.
Experiments in Group 2 used different task procedures, which
are explained in Sections VI and VII, respectively.
A. Participant Recruitment
All experiments were conducted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), and the human intelligent task (HIT) was
posted with restrictions to US workers with at least 95%
approval rate and 100 or more approved HITs. We made these
restrictions in the studies to accurately represent sample re-
strictions of most recent MTurk research [22]. All experiments
complied with the American Psychological Association Code
of Ethics and were approved by the Institutional Review Board
at the authors’ institutes. Informed consent was obtained for
each participant. Data of the experiments were anonymized
before analysis.
B. Differential Privacy Communication Design
To come up with the descriptions of DP and LDP to be used
in the study, we started from the descriptions published by the
companies and organizations that deployed these techniques,
and then conducted multiple rounds of internal discussion and
review of the descriptions. In the discussions, we involved
experts of differential privacy to ensure that our descriptions
of DP and LDP are technically accurate, and laypeople to help
ensure that they can be understood. As mathematical rigour
is one key strength of DP and LDP, we decided not to shy
away from using mathematical terms such as “probability”
or “aggregated data” in some of the descriptions. The full
descriptions of all conditions used in the experiments are given
in Table XII from Appendix D.
To verify and enhance participants’ understanding, we
added one check question asking participants to recognize the
presented technique immediately after each textual description
(see Appendix A). For participants who did not answer the
question correctly, we presented the corresponding description
again. We asked the same check question in the post-session
questionnaire evaluating the effect of the second presentation.
C. Heath App Data Collection Setting
For each experiment, we presented the same health app data
collection scenario in which each participant was instructed
to play the role of an health app user in three steps (see
Appendix A for the details). Within the instructions, we
present examples of collected data (e.g., age and gender) at
the local app and the app server to let participants better
understand the health app data collection and then situate
themselves in the hypothetical setting we created.
IV. EXPERIMENT 1
Before Experiment 1, we conducted Pilot Study 1, which
used the health app data collection setting described above.
We had the following findings from Pilot Study 1. Participants
showed less willingness to answer the high-sensitive questions
than the low-sensitive ones. When the loss framing (explaining
privacy threat of data sharing) was presented, participants’
data disclosure was reduced regardless of question sensitivity,
and the reduction was larger for the high-sensitive questions.
Thus, we obtained the effect of question sensitivity and the
framing effect [3], [5], [21], confirming the health app data
collection setting and hypothetical willingness to disclose
personal information as a testbed to evaluate privacy decisions.
See Appendix B for additional details of Pilot Study 1.
Since the benefit of data disclosure in lieu of privacy threat
is often emphasized in the wild, we chose to mention the
benefit of data sharing (i.e., the gain framing) in Experiment 1.
We evaluated the effect of communicating differential privacy
techniques on participants’ data sharing decisions (RQ1) with
four between-subjects conditions: Control, Gain Framing, DP,
and LDP. We predicted a main effect of question sensitivity
as Pilot Study 1. With an emphasis on possible benefit, we ex-
pected that participants in the Gain Framing condition would
become less concerned about their privacy, and thus would
increase data sharing compared to the Control condition.
With extra privacy protection in the DP and LDP conditions,
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participants would increase their data disclosure further, more
for the LDP condition with better privacy guarantee.
A. Participants and Stimuli
We recruited 598 Amazon MTurk workers. Each participant
was paid 1 US dollar for completing the study (median
completion time: about 289 seconds) The payment rate was
the same for all experiments except Experiment 3 (see details
in Table XI). The descriptions of DP and LDP used in the
study focused on definitions, and we listed the organizations
which have implemented the techniques (see Table XII).
B. Procedure
After accepting the HIT, all participants were directed
from MTurk to a survey on Qualtrics, and were assigned to
one condition randomly. At the beginning of all conditions
except Control, we emphasized the benefit of sharing personal
information. The study continued with a goal description. Fol-
lowing the three-step health-app data collection scenario, the
corresponding differential privacy description was presented
in the DP or LDP condition (see Appendix A for the detailed
descriptions). Then, participants in all conditions answered
their data sharing decisions for 14 questions. Consistent with
[3], [21], we divide them into seven low-sensitive questions
(i.e., the reason to use the health app, exercise experience, ex-
ercise time, gender, height, weight, vegetarian) and seven high-
sensitive questions (i.e., date of birth, family medical record,
substance use, surgery record, diagnostic record, income level,
current medication).
Fig. 2: Instructions of survey questions in Experiments 1, 2A and
2B. “with DP” was added to end of options 2 and 3 for all DP related
conditions, and “with LDP” was added in the same way for all LDP
related conditions.
Each question with its options was presented within a smart-
phone layout (see Fig. 2). Participants were instructed that
their task was to read the survey question, decide their answer
to it, and select how they would like their answer to be used.
Note that we did not ask participants to actually provide
the answers. We distinguished two types of usage for the
collected data, local and at the app server. So for each question,
participants were asked to decide whether they would like the
data being used (a) locally only, (b) both locally and at the
app server, (c) neither, or (d) prefer not to answer.
The 14 questions were presented randomly in each condi-
tion. After answering the 14 questions, participants completed
a questionnaire that asked for demographic information (e.g.,
age, gender, education, and computer-science background).
We also asked participants to indicate their agreement with
statements on their trust for the app and the server on a 7-
point Likert Scale (1: strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree),
respectively (see Appendix A).
For the DP and LDP conditions, a check question (see
Appendix A) was presented after the differential privacy
description and before data sharing decision-making. For
participants who did not answer the question correctly, we
presented the corresponding description again. Participants
answered the check question again at the end of the post-
session questionnaire. They also indicated their trust level
for DP or LDP on the 7-point scale. We did not obtain any
significant difference of the trust evaluations except that there
was a main effect of condition in the current experiment,
χ2(3) = 11.44, p = .009. Participants in the DP condition
(65.3%) showed more trust than participants in the Gain
Framing condition did (50.5%), padj = .007. Thus, we omit
the results of trust evaluation but discuss them in the General
Discussion (Section VIII).
C. Results
Participants were excluded from data analysis using two
criteria: duplicate IP address and overall completion time less
than 120 seconds. Due to the main interest in the effect of dif-
ferential privacy communication, we also excluded participants
who did not answer the second check question correctly. The
number of participants excluded from data analysis were listed
in Table XI. Consequently, 87 participants from the Control,
101 from the Gain Framing, 150 from the DP, and 127 from
the LDP, were included in the data analysis. The demographic
distributions were similar between conditions. See Table I for
descriptive statistics.
We measured the selected option of each question for each
participant. Decisions were coded as Opt out when participants
chose “Neither used by the app locally nor the server” or “I
prefer not to answer”. Choices of Local only (“Only used by
the app locally”) and Both (“Used by the app locally and the
server”), as well as Opt out decisions were determined of each
question for each participant.
Opt out decision, selection for Local only option, and choice
of Both option collapsed across participants (see the first
column of Fig. 3) were entered into a 2 (question sensitivity:
low-sensitive, high-sensitive) × 4 (condition: Control, Gain
Framing, DP, LDP) chi-squared tests with a significance level
of .05, respectively. Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni correc-
tions [6] were performed, testing all pairwise comparisons
with corrected p-values for possible inflation. We report the
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statistics only for the significant effects in the text. Please refer
to Table VII for the full results of statistical tests.
TABLE I: Demographics of participants in each experiment. The
number of participants of each experiment was listed in the brackets
on the top row. EXP. means Experiment.
Item Options EXP.1(465)
EXP.2A
(581)
EXP.2B
(468)
EXP.3
(278)
EXP.4
(540)
G
en
de
r Male 56.8% 50.4% 47.9% 55.0% 52.6%
Female 43.0% 49.4% 51.3% 44.6% 46.7%
Other 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 0.2%
Not to answer 0% 0% 0.2% 0% 0.6%
A
ge
18-24 8.2% 7.1% 6.6% 10.1% 8.9%
25-34 47.7% 42.7% 44.9% 35.3% 34.4%
35-44 24.9% 28.7% 29.1% 26.6% 23.0%
45-54 10.3% 13.3% 11.1% 15.5% 16.5%
55 or older 8.6% 7.9% 8.3% 12.6% 16.9%
Not to answer 0.2% 0.3% 0% 0% 0.4%
E
du
ca
tio
n
No high school 0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4%
High School 27.7% 20.5% 23.7% 25.9% 24.6%
College/Bachelor 60.20% 65.9% 62.4% 59% 59.1%
Masters/Ph.D. 10.8% 11.9% 12.0% 10.8% 13.9%
Medical degree 0.6% 0.9% 1.7% 1.8% 0.4%
Not to answer 0.6% 0.7% 0% 2.2% 0.7%
C
S
B
ac
k Yes 22.8% 19.4% 28.8% 20.5% 20.0%
No 75.9% 79.3% 70.3% 76.7% 78.5%
Not to answer 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 2.9% 1.5%
1) RQ1. Effect of Differential Privacy Descriptions: With
extra DP and LDP descriptions, participants’ overall decision
rates were similar to that of the Gain Framing condition,
but they showed more willingness to share high-sensitive
information.
Opt out rate. Participants opted out more for the high-
sensitive questions (20.2%) than for the low-sensitive ques-
tions (6.0%), χ2(1) = 290, p < .001. Neither the main effect
of condition (Control vs. Gain Framing vs. LDP vs. DP:
12.9% vs. 14.3% vs. 11.8% vs. 13.5%), nor its interaction with
question sensitivity was significant, suggesting little framing
effect or the effect of differential privacy communication.
Local only selection rate. The selection rate was larger for
the high-sensitive questions (41.8%) than for the low-sensitive
questions (32.8%), χ2(1) = 43.38, p < .001. The selection
rates differed across conditions (Control: 42.9%, Gain Fram-
ing 35.5%, LDP 38.5%, DP: 32.4%), χ2(3) = 40.31, p < .001.
Post-hoc analyses revealed a significant difference between
Control and Gain Framing, padj < .001, suggesting a fram-
ing effect. However, there were no differences among Gain
Framing, DP, and LDP conditions.
The two-way interaction of question sensitivity × condition
was significant, χ2(3) = 25.19, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons
showed that participants in the Gain Framing and Control
conditions selected more local options for the high-sensitive
questions than for the low-sensitive questions, padjs < .001,
but such pattern was not evident in the DP or the LDP
condition. Thus, participants preferred high-sensitive personal
information to be used by the app locally, but such preference
disappeared when they were informed of DP or LDP.
Both selection rate. Similar to the Local only option results,
main effects of question sensitivity, χ2(1) = 325.65, p < .001,
condition, χ2(3) = 30.31, p < .001, as well as their interaction,
χ2(3) = 22.45, p < .001, were all significant. Specifically, the
selection rate for the high-sensitive questions (37.9%) was
smaller than that for the low-sensitive questions (61.1%). For
the average selection rate of each condition (Control: 44.2%;
Gain Framing: 50.2%; LDP: 49.7%; DP: 54.0%), pairwise
comparisons were all significantly different, padjs < .045,
except for Gain Framing vs. LDP and Gain Framing vs. DP.
Although the effect of question sensitivity was significant
for all conditions, padjs < .001, results of the high- and low-
sensitive questions showed different patterns across conditions.
For the low-sensitive questions, the selection rate of the Gain
Framing condition was larger than that of Control and LDP,
padjs < .013, but not DP. For the high-sensitive questions,
the selection rates for the DP and LDP conditions were higher
than that of Gain Framing, padjs < .048, indicating the effect
of differential privacy communication.
2) RQ2. DP vs. LDP: Participants showed more willingness
to share their information with the DP description than for the
LDP description.
Opt out rate. Results of LDP (13.6%) and DP (14.3%)
conditions showed no significant difference. Similar results
were obtained for both the low- and high-sensitive questions.
Local only selection rate. Post-hoc analyses revealed that
participants’ selection rate of the LDP condition (38.5%) was
larger than that of the DP condition (32.4%), padj < .001.
Also, such difference was evident for questions of high sensi-
tivity, padj = .024, and of low sensitivity, padj = .047.
Both selection rate. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons re-
vealed that the average selection rate of LDP (49.7%) was
smaller than that of DP (54.0%), padj = .045. Nevertheless,
the selection rate of the LDP condition showed no significant
difference from that of the DP condition either for the low-
sensitive or high-sensitive questions.
3) Correct Rate of Check Questions: The correct rate of
the DP condition was higher than that of the LDP condition.
Better results were evident for the second check question than
for the first check question regardless of conditions.
Correct answers for check questions collapsed across par-
ticipants were entered into a 2 (check: first, second) × 2
(condition: DP, LDP) chi-squared tests. The correct rate for
the DP condition (71.6%) was higher than that of the LDP
condition (61.8%), χ2(1) = 7.60, p = .006, suggesting that
the concept of DP was easier to recognize than that of LDP.
The correct rate of the second question (74.7%) was higher
than that of the first one (58.7%), χ2(1) = 20.53, p < .001,
indicating the effect of an extra presentation. The interaction of
check × condition was not significant. Thus the effect of extra
presentation played a similar role between the two conditions.
D. Discussion
Consistent with the results of Pilot Study 1, participants
showed more privacy concerns for the high-sensitive ques-
tions than for the low-sensitive questions. The gain framing
showed little effect on participants’ opt-out decisions, but
it increased participants’ data disclosure compared to the
Control. Moreover, such increase was only evident for the low-
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Fig. 3: Selection rates of Opt-out decisions (top row), Local only (middle row), and Both (bottom row) options for the low-sensitive and
the high-sensitive questions in different conditions of Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B.
sensitive questions, indicating a risk aversion dependent on the
question’s sensitivity.
When participants were further informed of DP or LDP pro-
tection, their overall data sharing did not increase. Neverthe-
less, they increased their data disclosure for the high-sensitive
questions, suggesting a positive effect of communicating DP
and LDP. Moreover, the overall data disclosure rate of the DP
condition was larger than that of the LDP condition. Together
with the better results of check questions, those results suggest
that DP seems to be easier for participants to understand, and
thus resulted in more data sharing.
We conjecture that the better results for the DP condition
may be due to the specific descriptions that we presented. In
particular, data perturbation before data collection providing
stronger privacy guarantee for LDP was not clearly described.
Also, we included organization names when introducing DP
and LDP techniques. Participants’ trust of DP and LDP may
depend on their trust of the associated organizations.
V. EXPERIMENTS 2A & 2B
To examine factors that affect DP and LDP descriptions
in users’ data disclosure decisions, we conducted two sub-
experiments. In Experiment 2A, we emphasized the data
perturbation processes of LDP and examined whether partici-
pants would understand the better privacy protection and thus
increase their data disclosure. We also removed the company
names associated with DP and LDP to understand their influ-
ence on participants’ data disclosure decisions. Considering
the difficulty for laypersons to relate data perturbation with
privacy protection, we examined the effect of communicating
the implications of DP and LDP techniques in Experiment 2B.
A. Experiment 2A
1) Participants, Stimuli, and Procedure: Another 781 Ama-
zon MTurk workers were recruited. To understand the effect
of company name, we proposed DP w/o Names and LDP w/o
Names conditions, which were the same as the DP and LDP
conditions of Experiment 1 except company names associated
with DP and LDP were removed. To improve users’ compre-
hension of the better privacy protection provided by LDP, we
included a LDP Comp. condition, in which the description
differed from that of Experiment 1 by emphasizing that data
perturbation (noise) was added before sending users’ responses
to the server. To further understand the combined influence of
the company names and the new description, we included a
LDP Comp. w/o Names condition, which was the same as LDP
Comp. but the company names were removed. The detailed
descriptions for all conditions are listed in Table XII. The
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1.
2) Results: We excluded participants from data analysis
using the same criterion as Experiment 1 (see details in
Table XI). Consequently, 125 participants from the DP w/o
Names, 149 from the LDP w/o Names, 161 from the LDP
Comp. w/o Names, and 146 from LDP Comp. were included
in the data analyses. Results of each option are shown in the
second column of Fig. 3, and were entered into chi-squared
tests similar to prior experiment. Post-hoc comparisons were
also performed in a similar way.
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a) RQ2. Effects of Company Names and Emphasizing
Data Perturbation: Without company names, participants’
data sharing decisions became similar between DP and LDP
descriptions. In the local setting, question sensitivity became
significant for the LDP w/o Names description but not for the
DP w/o Names description.
Opt-out rate of the high-sensitive questions was less for the
LDP Comp. w/o Names condition than that for the LDP w/o
Names condition. However, participants in the LDP Comp.
w/o Names condition preferred to share more high-sensitive
information in the local setting than participants in the LDP
w/o Names and DP w/o Names conditions.
Opt out rate. Like the prior experiment, participants
showed more willing to opt out for the high-sensitive ques-
tions (17.5%) than for the low-sensitive questions (4.1%),
χ2(1) = 372.68, p < .001. The two-way interaction of ques-
tion sensitivity × condition was at .05 significance level,
χ2(3) = 7.88, p = .048. No difference was evident among
all conditions for the low-sensitive questions. For the high-
sensitive questions, the selection rate of the LDP w/o Names
condition (20.1%) was larger than that of the LDP Comp. w/o
Names condition (15.3%), padj = .020.
Local only selection rate. Participants selected more Local
only option for the high-sensitive (38.1%) than for the low-
sensitive questions (31.6%), χ2(1) = 41.54, p < .001. The
interaction of question sensitivity × condition was significant,
χ2(3) = 12.74, p = .005. The effect of sensitivity was
significant for all conditions, padjs < .019, except for the DP
w/o Names condition. Thus, when company names were not
mentioned, same results as Experiment 1 were evident for DP
but not LDP, suggesting the effect of company names in the
LDP description. Moreover, post-hoc analysis revealed that
selection results across conditions showed no difference for
the low-sensitive questions, but for the high-sensitive questions
selection ratio of the LDP Comp. w/o Names was greater than
that of LDP w/o Names and DP w/o Names, padjs < .017.
Both selection rate. Similar to the other two options, the
main effect of question sensitivity, χ2(1) = 331.56, p < .001,
and its interaction with condition, χ2(3) = 9.06, p = .029,
were significant. Participants selected more Both option for
the low-sensitive questions (64.3%) than for the high-sensitive
questions (44.4%). Post-hoc analysis showed that the effect of
sensitivity was significant for all conditions, padjs < .001.
Although pairwise comparisons showed no significant dif-
ferences across conditions for both sensitive levels, different
patterns were revealed: For the low-sensitive questions, the
selection rate of the DP w/o Names condition was numer-
ically smallest. In contrast, for the high-sensitive questions,
its selection rate was numerically largest (see Fig. 3 second
column).
b) Correct rate of check questions.: Better correct rates
were obtained for the two LDP Comp. conditions. Same as
the prior experiment, participants’ correct answer rate for the
second check question was better than that for the first check
question regardless of conditions.
Check questions were analyzed in a similar way as Exper-
iment 1. Overall, the correct rates differed across conditions,
χ2(3) = 24.75, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons revealed
that the difference was mainly due to better results of the
LDP Comp. w/o Names (77.5%) and LDP Comp. (73.9%)
conditions than that of the DP w/o Names condition (61.7%),
padjs > .004, indicating the effect of emphasizing the data
perturbation processes. Same as Experiment 1, the correct rate
of the second question (77.8%) was higher than that of the first
question (63.5%), χ2(1) = 36.25, p < .001.
3) Discussion: With an emphasis on data perturbation
processes, the opt-out rate of the high-sensitive questions was
smaller for the LDP Comp. w/o Names condition than for the
LDP w/o Names condition. The check question results of the
two LDP Comp. conditions were also better than that of the DP
w/o Names condition. Instead of increasing their data sharing,
participants in the LDP Comp. w/o Names condition selected
more Local only option for the high-sensitive questions than
participants in the LDP w/o Names and DP w/o Names condi-
tions. Thus, an emphasis on data perturbation processes helped
participants recognize the strong privacy premise of LDP, but
it seemed to make them misbelieve that such protection is
local and thus showed more willingness to share the high-
sensitive information locally. The effect of “local” word was
also implied by more selection of Local only option in the
LDP condition than in the DP condition in Experiment 1.
After removing the company names, the data disclosure
differences between the DP and LDP conditions in Experiment
1 were not evident. For the Local only option, the non-
significant effect of question sensitivity for both DP and LDP
conditions in Experiment 1 became significant for the LDP
w/o Names condition only. Altogether, those results suggest
the company names contributed to the differences obtained
between the DP and LDP conditions in Experiment 1, and the
company names associated with LDP seemed to have more
impact than company names associated with DP.
B. Experiment 2B
As suggested by the results of Experiment 2A, participants
had difficulty in understanding what do data perturbation
processes mean for privacy protection. Thus, we conducted
Experiment 2B examining whether communicating the privacy
implication [31] of data perturbation will help participants
understand the stronger privacy promise of LDP.
1) Participants, Stimuli, and Procedure: Extra 600 Amazon
MTurk workers were recruited. Materials and procedures of
Experiments 2B were identical to Experiment 2A except DP
Imp. and LDP Imp. descriptions (i.e., whether the privacy
protection provided by DP or LDP relies on the trustworthiness
of the company or the server) were implemented. We also
included one LDP Imp. w/o Local condition to examine any
impact of the word “local” on participants’ data sharing
decisions. The detailed descriptions are listed in Table XII.
2) Results: After excluding participants using the same
criteria as prior experiments (see details in Table XI), there
were 162 participants in the DP Imp. condition, 149 in the
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LDP Imp. condition, and 157 in the LDP Imp. w/o Local
condition. Selections of each option collapsed across partici-
pants (see Fig. 3 last column) were analyzed similarly as prior
experiments.
a) RQ2. Effects of Implication Descriptions and Word
“Local”: More data sharing and fewer opt out were evident
for the two LDP Imp. conditions than for the DP Imp. condi-
tion regardless of questions’ sensitivity. With the implication
descriptions, no significant difference was evident between
LDP Imp. and LDP Imp. w/o Local.
Opt out rate. Participants opted out more for the high-
sensitive questions (17.8%) than for the low-sensitive ques-
tions (5.8%), χ2(1) = 229.49, p < .001. Opt-out rates also
differed across conditions, χ2(2) = 10.77, p = .005, with the
obtained result of the DP Imp. condition (13.6%) being larger
than those of the LDP Imp. (10.9%) and the LDP Imp. w/o
Local (10.8%) conditions, padjs < .026. The two-way interac-
tion of sensitivity × condition was not significant. Thus, across
experiments, for the first time, we obtained a smaller opt-out
rate for LDP than for DP regardless of question sensitivity,
suggesting the effect of implication communication.
Local only selection rate. Same as the opt-out decisions,
only the two main effects were significant. Participants se-
lected more Local only options for the high-sensitive questions
(33.7%) than for the low-sensitive questions (28.3%), χ2(1) =
22.58, p < .001. Selection rates varied across conditions,
χ2(2) = 12.36, p = .002. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
revealed that the selection rate of DP Imp. (33.7%) was larger
than those of LDP Imp. (30.3%), padj = .049, and LDP Imp.
w/o Local (29%), padj = .002, respectively.
Both selection rate. Participants decided to share more low-
sensitive information (65.9%) than high-sensitive information
(48.4%), χ2(1) = 206.02, p < .001. The main effect of condi-
tion was significant, χ2(2) = 29.2, p < .001. Post-hoc compar-
isons revealed that the selection rate of DP Imp. (52.6%) was
less than those of LDP Imp. (58.7%), padj = .016, and LDP
Imp. w/o Local (60.2%), padj < .001, respectively.
b) Correct rate of check questions: A larger correct rate
was obtained for the DP Imp. condition than for the two LDP
Imp. conditions. Same as the prior experiments, participants’
correct answer rate for the second check question was better
than for the first check question regardless of condition.
Check-questions’ results were analyzed similarly as Ex-
periment 2A. The correct rates differed across conditions,
χ2(2) = 13.41, p = .001. Post-hoc comparisons revealed
that the difference was mainly due to better results of DP
Imp. (81.6%) than those of LDP Imp. (71.6%) and LDP
Imp. w/o Local (71.6%), padjs < .004. But the two LDP
Imp. conditions did not differ. The correct rate of the second
check question (81.3%) was higher than the first one (68.6%),
χ2(1) = 23.95, p < .001.
3) Discussion: In Experiment 2B, we made it clear to
participants that DP but not LDP relies on the trustworthiness
of the company or the server for privacy protection. When such
implications were communicated, more data sharing and few
opt out were obtained for the two LDP Imp. conditions than for
the DP Imp. condition regardless of question sensitivity. How-
ever, the results of check questions revealed that participants
did better for answering the DP concept. Altogether, those
results indicate that participants understood better protection
provided by LDP, but the concept of DP might still be easier
for them to recognize. We did not obtain any difference
between the two LDP Imp. conditions, indicating little impact
of the word “local” with implication communication.
C. Summary of Experiments 1 and 2
Using the health app data collection setting and hypothetical
willingness to disclose sensitive personal information as the
testbed, we evaluated participants’ data disclosure rates as
a function of differential privacy description. When defini-
tions of DP and LDP were communicated (Experiment 1),
participants increased their data disclosure for high-sensitive
information, suggesting a positive effect of communicating
differential privacy to laypeople. However, the overall data
sharing was better for DP than for LDP, though the latter
provides better privacy guarantee.
When we emphasized the data perturbation processes of
LDP (Experiment 2A), participants showed more willingness
to share high-sensitive information with the app locally. How-
ever, when the implications of DP or LDP (i.e., whether
the privacy protection relies on the trustworthiness of the
company) was presented (Experiment 2B), participants showed
the willingness to opt out less and to share more with LDP
than with DP. Altogether, those results suggest laypeople
have difficulty in understanding the definitions, especially the
perturbation processes of differential privacy. But communi-
cation of implications is effective, especially in helping them
understand which technique provides better privacy protection.
VI. EXPERIMENT 3
We conducted an open-question survey to understand why
participants decided to share or not share their personal
information given the differential privacy protection (RQ3),
and how easy it is for them to understand the descriptions
subjectively (RQ4).
A. Participants, Stimuli, and Procedure
We recruited extra 280 Amazon MTurk workers. Besides
the differential privacy descriptions from prior experiments,
we investigated the descriptions published by companies and
organizations that implemented DP or LDP, including Apple,
Google, Microsoft, Uber, and US Census Bureau. We made
minor changes to those descriptions to make them fit into our
study (see descriptions in Table XII from Appendix D).
At the beginning of the survey, participants were instructed
that the study is (1) to evaluate their data disclosure decision
given one privacy protection technique, and (2) to understand
why they decide to do so. Then, we described the three steps
of role play as prior experiments. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the descriptions. After viewing the de-
scription, participants made one data disclosure decision for
high-sensitive information only (see details in Appendix A).
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Then they answered an open question about the reason for
their choice. We also asked them to indicate their agreement
on whether the description was easy to comprehend on a 7-
point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree).
For participants who gave ratings less than 4, we asked them
to highlight the words or sentences that they thought were
difficult to understand. In the end, participants answered the
same demographic questions as prior experiments.
B. Results
Only duplicate IP address was used for data exclusion due
to short survey time (see Table XI). Another participant who
failed to complete the study was also excluded. Table I lists
the summary of participants’ demographics.
1) Data Disclosure Decision and Difficult-to-Comprehend
Rates: Given descriptions of differential privacy protection,
47.8% of the participants chose to share their high-sensitive
information on average (see Table II). Across all conditions,
the numerically largest sharing rate was obtained in the LDP
Imp. condition (65.2%), in agreement with the results obtained
in Experiment 2B. On average, 13.3% of the participants gave
a rating less than 4, indicating that they had difficulty in under-
standing the presented descriptions. For conditions included
terms, such as “noise” or “random responses” (e.g., LDP,
Google, US Census Bureau), about 18% of the participants
rated the descriptions as difficult (see Table II). In contrast,
for conditions without those terms and mentioned benefits or
implications of the techniques (e.g., DP Imp., Uber), around
5% of the participants gave ratings less than 4. No participants
in the DP Imp. condition rated the description as hard to
understand, in agreement with better check questions results
obtained in Experiment 2B.
TABLE II: Difficult-to-comprehension and sharing decision rates
for all descriptions in Experiment 3. The number of participants in
each condition is listed in the brackets of the first column.
Condition Difficult-to-Comprehend Rate
Sharing
Decision Rate
DP Imp. (22) 0.0% 36.4%
LDP Comp. (22) 4.5% 40.9%
Microsoft (19) 5.3% 52.6%
LDP Imp. w/o Local (18) 5.6% 44.4%
Uber (18) 5.6% 55.6%
LDP Imp. (23) 8.7% 65.2%
LDP Comp. w/o Names (18) 11.1% 50.0%
Apple (21) 14.3% 57.1%
LDP w/o Names (19) 15.8% 52.6%
DP (21) 19.0% 33.3%
Google (19) 21.1% 42.1%
LDP (17) 23.5% 41.2%
US Census Bureau (21) 23.8% 47.6%
DP w/o Names (20) 30.0% 50.0%
2) Answers to Open Questions: We analyzed the results of
open questions by identifying themes and generating codes
using an inductive approach [7]. The first two authors inde-
pendently coded the answers for open questions based on the
data disclosure decisions and easy-to-comprehend measures,
and then cleaned up the codes to generate new ones. We then
re-coded the results using the new codes and added emerging
codes when necessary. Lastly, the research team discussed the
codes and grouped them into different themes. We assigned
random sequential numbers to participants for the analysis.
a) Why share?: One hundred and thirty-three partici-
pants choosing to share personal information. Their explana-
tions were grouped into three main themes:
• Trust of DP and LDP techniques. About 61% (82) of
the participants decided to share their information because
of or partially because of the described privacy protection.
Their replies indicate trust for privacy protection techniques
generally, such as “it sounds like a viable and trustworthy
type of protection technique, and I don’t feel wary about
trusting it.” (P124). Moreover, 28 of them demonstrated
somewhat understanding of differential privacy in their
replies, e.g., “I think an additional random data set might
throw off how certain information can tie to you” (P46).
• Utility consideration. About 26% (34) of the participants
made the decisions due to or partly due to their data would
be useful or beneficial for the app, the service they got,
or the other people. Examples include “I feel that I would
be able to get more accurate information if it collects my
data...” (P48), and “If it helps to provide data to make a
more accurate algorithm or helps with someone’s research
I’m willing to provide it” (P117). Also, 14 participants’
answers revealed their considerations for both utility and
privacy, e.g., “I am comfortable to share this information for
the benefit that will be served to me. The privacy technique
sounds like it will keep all users equally obfuscated” (P119).
• Little privacy concern for asked or any information,
learned helpless, and no fear of loss. About 22% (29)
participants explained that they made the decisions because
(1) they did not care about the privacy for the asked
information or any information, e.g., “...personally I don’t
currently have a significant history of medical problems,
substance abuse, family history, etc...” (P113); (2) a lot of
their personal information was already out, e.g., “we share
a lot of info already on social media” (P10); or (3) there
was nothing to hide or protect, e.g., “I don’t think its really
that big a deal, i tell everyone my business lol” (P39).
b) Why not share?: We also performed a similar analysis
to understand why 142 participants chose not to share, the
results of which were grouped into the following four themes:
• Too sensitive to share. About 37% (53) of the participants
decided not to share because of the sensitivity level of
requested information, e.g., “Because it’s personal I have
a long list of medical conditions, and my family wouldn’t
want me to share their personal information as well” (P144),
and “Even if the privacy policy is equivalent to an opt out
which might be fine for other circumstances but when you
are talking about your health records it just wouldn’t be
worth the risk.” (P224).
• Distrust differential privacy techniques. About 33% (47)
of the participants explained that they distrust the described
differential privacy techniques. Besides the general concern
of privacy techniques, e.g., “This technique does not sound
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like it is full proof. I think a hacker could get through this
system real easy.” (P154), participants distrusted differential
privacy techniques because (1) the descriptions were vague,
e.g., “I did not understand the explanation of how the
protection worked” (P200); (2) the techniques were new,
e.g., “Its not tested enough too new.” (P167); and (3) further
verification is needed, e.g., “I’m still not fully convinced that
it is trustworthy. I’d need to know more about the processes
involved and how thoroughly tested it has been” (P191).
• Risks of data leak, breach, or hack. About 30% (43) of
the participants worried about future risk of leak, breach, or
hack of their data, and thus chose not to share, e.g., “...All of
the data breaches that have occurred in recent years already
prove that no privacy protection technique is 100%. I would
like to limit the chances of my info being leaked as much
as possible.” (P271).
• Distrust the app or tech companies. Another 19% (27)
participants explained that they chose not to share because
they distrust the app or the tech companies, e.g., “How good
the privacy protection technique is one thing, and whether
they will sell my private data to other parties is another
thing. I never fully trust such kind of app/technique.” (P227).
c) Which part(s) is hard to understand?: Thirty-seven
participants indicated that the descriptions were hard to under-
stand. They highlighted mostly the words “noise” (19 times)
and “random(ly)”(14 times), both of which are related to the
perturbation processes. When answering why they thought the
description was unintelligible, about half (17) of the partici-
pants’ replies mentioned random noise, including “How will
the random noise protect my information?...” (P90) and “what
is random noise?” (P162). Nine participants also indicated that
the descriptions were jargony or had technical terms.
C. Discussion
Experiment 3 employed an open-question survey to under-
stand factors impacting people’s data sharing decisions for
high-sensitive information when given descriptions of DP or
LDP. We found that participants decided to share primarily
because of the descriptions of differential privacy techniques
and somewhat utility consideration. Participants who chose not
to share had various concerns: about 1/3 of them believed that
the requested information was too sensitive to share, another
1/3 distrusted the described differential privacy techniques,
and an extra 1/3 worried about negative consequences of
sharing high-sensitive information in the future.
We also evaluated participants’ subjective comprehension
of descriptions to uncover the difficult parts to understand.
Less than 15% of the participants rated those descriptions as
hard to comprehend. They highlighted parts closely related
to data perturbation processes as most difficult to understand,
consistent with results obtained in Experiments 2A and 2B.
VII. EXPERIMENT 4
While participants’ self-reported comprehension was good
for the descriptions, it is unclear whether the same holds for
their comprehension performance. To understand participants’
objective comprehension of DP and LDP (RQ5), we proposed
questions evaluating their understanding of privacy and utility
impacts, such as utility cost and who can see their data.
Based on the findings from prior experiments, we also
proposed two new descriptions, DP Flow and LDP Flow. In
each new description, we described the data flow affording
privacy and utility implication inferences while simplifying
the technical details such as noise and perturbation. We
examined the effect of two new descriptions in improving
people’s understanding of DP and LDP by comparing them
with descriptions from prior experiments.
To make sure the two new descriptions and objective
comprehension questions are understandable, we conducted
Pilot Study 2 with 20 participants. The procedure was identical
to Experiment 4 except that after answering each question,
participants also indicated their agreement on whether the
presented question was easy to comprehend on the 7-point
Likert Scale. For any question with a rating lower than 4, we
asked them to describe which part or parts of the question are
hard to understand and briefly explain why. Participants gave
overall high ratings for both descriptions and all questions
except Q4 (see details in Appendix C). Based on participants’
replies, we improved the question and both descriptions.
A. Participants, Stimuli, and Procedure
We recruited another 599 Amazon MTurk workers. Descrip-
tions of DP Flow and LDP Flow are given in Table XII. For
each description, we introduced DP or LDP data flow by listing
different parties, such as external third-party companies, and
explaining how those parties are involved in the data flow.
We also added the description of accuracy loss, and removed
technical or jargon terms included in the former proposed
descriptions. Note, in the two new descriptions, the risk of
data compromise for DP and LDP was not described explicitly.
Descriptions of DP Imp., LDP Imp., DP w/o Names, and LDP
w/o Names were also included for comparisons with the new
descriptions.
We evaluated participants’ comprehension of DP and LDP
with five questions. Three of them were about privacy in-
ferences from the perspectives of attackers (Q1), internal
employees (Q2), and third-party companies (Q3). Another
two were about utility inferences from the perspectives of
the app company (Q4) and third-party companies (Q5) (See
Appendix C).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six
descriptions. At the beginning, we informed participants that
the study was to evaluate their comprehension of one privacy
protection technique based on the given description (see Ap-
pendix A). Then, we described the three steps of role play
as prior experiments. After viewing the description of DP or
LDP, participants answered the five questions, which were
presented in a randomized order. We also randomized the
options except “Unsure” and “Prefer not to answer” for each
question. When answering each question, participants could
see the description by placing their cursor over the text of
“Hover here to see the description”. Participants also indicated
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whether the description of the privacy protection technique
was easy to comprehend on the 7-point Likert Scale. They
answered questions about their demographics in the end.
B. Results
The number of participants in each condition is listed in
the first row of Table III. Participants’ demographic showed
a similar pattern as prior experiments (see Table I). Correct
answer rate of each question for each description collapsed
across participants (see Table III) were entered into 3 (descrip-
tion: w/o Names, Imp., Flow) × 2 (technique: DP, LDP) chi-
squared tests. Post-hoc comparisons were also performed as
prior experiments. Participants’ average easy-to-comprehend
rating for each description were analyzed with analysis of
variance (ANOVA) using the same two factors as chi-squared
tests. Post-hoc tests were also performed with corrected p-
values for possible inflation.
TABLE III: Correct answer rate for each question and average
comprehension rating of each description in Experiment 4. The
number of participants in each condition is listed in the brackets
on the top row. The number in the brackets on the last row indicates
the standard error of each average rating.
Question w/o Names Imp. FlowDP
(88)
LDP
(90)
DP
(86)
LDP
(95)
DP
(86)
LDP
(95)
Privacy Attackers 19.3% 25.6% 87.2% 76.8% 51.1% 77.9%
Privacy Employees 28.4% 26.7% 40.7% 40.0% 47.7% 75.8%
Privacy Third Party 52.3% 32.2% 52.3% 50.5% 59.3% 75.8%
Utility Cost 27.3% 22.2% 14.0% 20.0% 48.8% 54.7%
Utility Third Party 55.7% 60.0% 81.4% 56.8% 89.5% 84.2%
Easy-to-Comprehend
Rating
4.52
(1.71)
3.53
(1.69)
4.99
(1.37)
4.57
(1.53)
4.52
(1.59)
5.29
(1.25)
RQ5: Effect of Description. The main effect of descrip-
tion was significant for all comprehension questions, χ2s >
24.77, ps < .001, (see Table X for the statistical details).
Across five questions, the best results were obtained for the
Flow descriptions except Q1, privacy inference of attackers,
in which the highest correct rates were evident for the Imp.
descriptions. Compared to the Imp. descriptions, risk of data
compromise is implicit in the Flow descriptions, suggesting
the effect of explicitness in helping comprehension.
Correct answer rates of all privacy-related questions for the
Imp. descriptions were larger than those for the w/o Names
descriptions. Nevertheless, the correct rates of utility-related
questions showed no significant difference between those two
types of descriptions. Thus, an implication description of data
breach is helpful for participants to understand the privacy
protection of differential privacy.
RQ5: Effects of Technique and Technique × Description.
The main effect of technique showed different patterns among
the comprehension questions. For privacy-related questions,
the overall correct rates were higher for the LDP conditions
than for the DP conditions, χ2s > 4.09, ps < .043, except
for Q3, privacy inference about third-party companies, which
showed no significant difference. Moreover, the two-way inter-
action of description × technique was significant for all three
privacy-related questions, χ2s > 10.77, ps < .005. Generally,
the difference between DP and LDP was evident for the w/o
Names and Flow descriptions, but not the Imp. descriptions.
For utility-related questions, better results were evident
for DP than for LDP on Q5, utility inference of third-party
companies, χ2(1) = 4.07, p = .044. Also, such pattern was only
evident with the Imp. descriptions, padj = .002, indicating the
importance of utility description for LDP.
For average easy-to-comprehend ratings, the main ef-
fect of description was significant, F(2,534) = 27.73, p <
.001, η2p = .075. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that
the average ratings of the Flow descriptions (4.90) were similar
to those of the Imp. descriptions (4.78), both of which were
higher than those of the w/o Names (3.94), padjs < .001.
Although the main effect of technique was not significant (DP
vs. LDP: 4.62 vs. 4.47), its interaction with description were
significant, F(2,534) = 13.14, p < .001, η2p = .047. Critically,
with the Flow descriptions, participants’ overall rating for
LDP was higher than that for DP (5.29 vs. 4.52), whereas
an opposite pattern was evident for both the Imp. (4.57 vs.
4.99) and the w/o Names (3.53 vs. 4.35) descriptions.
C. Discussion
Contrary to the self-reported results in Experiment 3, ob-
jective comprehension results revealed that participants had
difficulty in understanding the implications of DP and LDP,
especially with descriptions focusing on definition (i.e., the
w/o Names descriptions). Explicit descriptions about the trust-
worthiness of the company (i.e., the Imp. descriptions) im-
proved the correct answer rates for privacy inference ques-
tions, especially the inference about attackers. Participants’
correct answer rates for all questions were improved with
the Flow descriptions except the inference about attackers.
That is probably because the privacy inference of attackers
became somewhat implicit in the Flow descriptions compared
to the Imp. descriptions. Altogether, those results indicate the
effects of explicitness and descriptions affording implication
inferences in helping laypeople understand differential privacy.
D. Summary of Experiments 3 and 4
Using a similar setting as prior experiments, we asked
participants to explain why they decided to share or not share
their personal information given the descriptions of differential
privacy. Participants chose to share data mainly because of
the described privacy protection, but those who chose not to
disclose their personal information revealed different concerns,
including the requested information was too sensitive to share,
they distrusted the described privacy technique, and they
worried about the risk of data breach. Less than 15% of
participants rated the descriptions as hard to comprehend,
and they mainly highlighted the parts related to data per-
turbation processes as difficult to understand. Experiment 4
was conducted to understand how participants comprehend
DP and LDP objectively. Based on the findings from prior
experiments, we proposed the Flow descriptions which afford
privacy and utility implication inferences. Compared to the
Imp. and the w/o Names descriptions, we obtained better
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comprehension results for the Flow descriptions generally.
However, best privacy inference results were obtained when
the privacy implications were described explicitly. Overall,
these results revealed the complexity of people’s data dis-
closure decision-making, and the importance of implication
communication to help people understand DP and LDP.
VIII. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study reports four experiments that were moti-
vated by communicating differential privacy to facilitate users’
data disclosure decisions. In Experiments 1 and 2, we proposed
different ways of describing differential privacy techniques and
evaluated the effects of those descriptions on participants’ data
sharing decisions (RQ1-RQ2). In Experiments 3 and 4, rea-
sons behind participants’ data sharing decisions (RQ3), as well
as their subjective (RQ4) and objective (RQ5) comprehensions
of DP and LDP were examined, respectively.
A. Summary of Main Results
Difficult to Understand the Data Perturbation Processes.
When we presented DP and LDP techniques based on def-
inition, participants increased their data disclosure of high-
sensitive information. Participants’ data disclosure rates were
larger for DP than for LDP, despite the latter providing better
privacy guarantees. Moreover, participants reduced their data
sharing when the “local” aspect of LDP was emphasized.
Many participants explained that they made the sharing de-
cision because of the described techniques, but their answers
of objective comprehension questions indicated that they had
difficulty in understanding the privacy and utility implications
and might not differentiate the benefit of differential privacy
from the promise of any other privacy technology.
Effects of Descriptions Affording Implication Inferences.
When privacy implications (i.e., whether the privacy protection
relies on the trustworthiness of the company) were presented,
participants opted out less and shared more with LDP relative
to DP. Together with the highest correct answer rate of privacy
inferences obtained with implication descriptions, it indicates
that participants’ data disclosure decisions were closely related
to their correct understanding of privacy protection. When
privacy and utility inferences were embedded within data flow
descriptions, participants increased their correct answer rates
for objective comprehension questions, indicating that descrip-
tions affording implication inferences facilitate participants’
comprehension of differential privacy.
Primary Concern for Information Sensitivity. Our results
also revealed that information sensitivity is an important
moderator for people’s data disclosure decisions. On aver-
age, participants’ data disclosure rates of the high-sensitive
questions were 20% less than the low-sensitive questions in
the first two experiments. Participants, especially those who
have medical conditions, revealed that they worried about the
negative consequences of data leakage or misuse of medical-
related information, thus chose not to share.
B. Data Disclosure Decision-Making
The effect of information sensitivity on data sharing de-
cisions implies distribution differences between the collected
low-sensitive and high-sensitive information. Such differences
are informative to differential privacy algorithms or deploy-
ments in which such effect has not been accounted.
Besides information sensitivity, we also examined the fram-
ing effect to understand people’s data disclosure decisions.
With a loss framing presented in Pilot Study 1, participants
opted out less for the low-sensitive questions. When a gain
framing was presented in Experiments 1 and 2, participants
only increased their data disclosure for the low-sensitive ques-
tions. Thus, our results indicate that the bounded rationality
of privacy decisions [2], [25] was qualified by the sensitivity
of information, providing an explanation for the differences
obtained in prior studies [3], [21].
Extra factors impacting data sharing decisions were revealed
in the qualitative results of Experiment 3, which we grouped
into two categories: context-dependent and trustworthiness-
related. When making data disclosure decisions, participants
took personal contexts into consideration, e.g., whether they
have medical conditions, have been hacked before, or heard
about reports of user data breach. Some participants’ decisions
also factored in the trustworthiness of the technique or the
company, e.g., whether they believe differential privacy is
tested enough or the company’s intention to collect users’ data.
Thus, privacy-related decisions are multi-facet [40].
Towards effectively communicating differential privacy to fa-
cilitate users’ data disclosure, both general factors and users’
specific concerns should be understood and addressed.
C. Differential Privacy Communication
Our results revealed implication descriptions as one effec-
tive way to communicate differential privacy to laypeople.
However, compared to the privacy aspect, participants still had
difficulty in understanding the utility costs of DP and LDP. We
conjecture that this is mainly because the privacy implications
correspond to people’s privacy concerns (e.g., data breach
from attackers). Thus, the implication descriptions meet their
expectation of privacy protection techniques [31]. Since people
consider utility when making data sharing decisions, future
work should examine other formats, e.g., graphs, which can
intuitively illustrate accuracy loss in helping people understand
utility cost. Also, to understand possible trustworthiness gap
between DP and LDP, future work could include evaluation
results or third-party reports about DP and LDP.
With definition descriptions but not implication descriptions,
participants’ data disclosure decisions were impacted by spe-
cific wording, e.g., “local”, suggesting it may be as a result
of comprehension. That participants who did not understand
privacy implications were susceptible to extraneous factors
(e.g., company names) and considered those factors when
making data sharing decisions.
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D. Limitations
We note that proper caution should be taken to generalize
our finding to other settings. First, we examined the effect
of descriptions in data sharing decisions mainly based on the
stronger privacy promise of LDP than DP. Other factors, such
as utility cost, might render DP and LDP not strict alterna-
tives during preference decisions. However, comprehension of
utility cost showed no significant difference between DP and
LDP across w/o Names, Imp., and Flow descriptions. Thus,
any impact of utility cost should have a similar effect on the
obtained results.
Second, instead of answering the survey questions directly,
participants indicated their willingness of data sharing in a hy-
pothetical setting, limiting the ecological validity of the current
experimental design. Note that we decided to use this role-play
method to protect participants’ privacy. Prior studies showed
that people’s stated intentions and actual behavior sometimes
differ [37]. Yet, we replicated the well-known framing effects
using the health app setting and the hypothetical questions.
Thus, we are confident about our findings. Also, we were
mainly interested in the comparison between conditions, so
any effect of the role-play can cancel out.
Third, we recruited MTurk workers who tended to be
younger, better educated, and put more value on information
privacy [26]. Thus, our results may represent population hav-
ing more privacy concerns than the broader U.S. public.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Differential privacy techniques are currently being transi-
tioned from academic to industry. Across different approaches
of textual descriptions, our study shows that descriptions af-
fording privacy and utility implications can facilitate people’s
data sharing decisions and their comprehension of DP and
LDP techniques. Thus, our work highlights the importance of
user-centered deployment of differential privacy but also sheds
light on the challenges for usability research and studies.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
A. Experiments 1, 2A & 2B
In the current information age, everyone faces one question:
Will you share your personal information in return for a
product, service, or other benefits? [the gain framing]
The purpose of this study is to understand what kind of
information you are willing to share with a health app, and
how you would like your data to be used. For this survey,
suppose: 1) you just download a health app (Orange Health)
and start to use it; 2) to ensure appropriate health suggestions
and recommendations, the app asks you to provide some
information, for example, your age and gender for accurate
recommendation of daily calorie intake; 3) the app server
also requests permission to access and collect information to
provide you better user experience, for example, the informa-
tion you shared will be used to train some machine learning
algorithms at the server, which will then be used to provide
more accurate suggestions for all the users. [the three-step
role play]
To respect your personal information privacy and ensure
best user experience, the data shared with the app will be
collected via the local differential privacy (LDP) technique.
LDP protects users’ privacy by adding random noise to each
response that users give such that the probability that any
user’s attribute is inferred is similar as he or she is opt-out
for the data collection. LDP has been used by companies such
as Google and Apple. [the LDP description condition]
Please select which of the following description is correct
about local differential privacy (LDP). • A privacy protection
technique that adds random noise to the aggregated data (e.g.,
average age) collected from groups of users, such that the
users’ privacy can be protected in the same way as they
are opt-out for the data collection. • A privacy protection
technique that adds random noise to each response that the
users provided such that the users’ privacy can be protected in
the same way as they are opt-out for the data collection. • It
has not been implemented by any organization or company yet.
• None of the above is correct. • I prefer not to answer. [The
LDP description was presented again if participants did not
answer the above check question correctly. Then participants
decided their answers for 14 data sharing decisions with the
following question.] How would you like your answer to the
following question being used? • Only used by the app
locally • Used by the app locally and the server with LDP
• Neither used by the app locally nor the server with LDP
• I prefer not to answer [After the demographic questions,
participants evaluated their trust of all following items: A
{the health app, the app server, LDP/DP}.] Please indicate
your agreement with the following description: I trust {A} to
protect my personal information privacy. • Strongly Disagree
• Mostly Disagree • Somewhat Disagree • Neither Agree Nor
Disagree • Somewhat Agree • Mostly Agree • Strongly Agree
B. Experiment 3
The purpose of this study is to evaluate your willingness to
share information given one privacy protection technique and
to understand why you decide so. [The three-step role play
was presented.] To respect your personal information privacy
and ensure better user experience, the data shared with the
app will be collected via a privacy protection technique. Next
we will present you a description of the privacy protection
technique. Please read it carefully. [After viewing the LDP de-
scription, participants answered the question below.] Given the
privacy protection provided by the technique, will you share
your personal information (e.g., date of birth, family medical
record, income level, substance use, surgery record, diagnostic
record, current medication) with the app server? • Yes • No • I
prefer not to answer [Based on participants’ answer, they then
replied one open question.] Please briefly explain why you
did not want/would like to share your personal data given the
described privacy protection technique. [easy-to-comprehend
rating] Please indicate your agreement with the following
description on a 7-point Likert Scale: (1: Strongly disagree; 7:
Strongly agree). The prior description of the privacy protection
technique was easy for me to understand. • Strongly Disagree
• Mostly Disagree • Somewhat Disagree • Neither Agree Nor
Disagree • Somewhat Agree • Mostly Agree • Strongly Agree
[For participants who gave a rating smaller than 4, we asked
them the following question] You indicated that the description
of DP was not easy to understand. Please highlight the words
or sentences that are difficult for you to understand.
C. Experiment 4
The purpose of this study is to evaluate your understanding
of a privacy protection technique based on the given de-
scription. [The three-step role play was presented.] To respect
your personal information privacy and ensure better user
experience, the data shared with the app will be collected
via a privacy protection technique. Next we will present the
description of the privacy protection technique. Please read it
carefully and then answer several questions. [Then participants
viewed one description, answered the five questions listed in
Appendix C, and gave the easy-to-comprehend rating.]
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APPENDIX B
PILOT STUDY 1
We validated the health app data collection setting as testbed
by examining individuals’ data disclosure decision of survey
questions as a function of question sensitivity (high, low)
and framing effect (Control, Loss Framing). The question
sensitivity was varied within subjects, and the framing effect
was varied between subjects. We predicted that participants’
data disclosure for the high-sensitive questions would be less
than that for the low-sensitive questions, and participants in the
Loss Framing condition would have more privacy concerns,
thus would reduce data disclosure compared to the Control.
A. Participants and Stimuli
219 Amazon MTurk workers completed the online survey.
The procedure for both conditions was the same as that in
Experiment 1 except that description about loss due to privacy
concern was presented at the beginning of the Loss Framing
condition. The extra description of the Loss Framing condition
is as follows:
• Loss Framing: In the current information age, everyone
faces one question: Will you protect your personal infor-
mation in sacrifice of a product, service, or other benefits?
B. Results
Participants were excluded from data analysis using the
same criteria as main experiments (see Table XI). Results
of 103 participants from the Control and 101 from the Loss
Framing were included in the data analyses.
45.6% of the participants were female, and their ages
ranged from 18 to over 50 years, with 87.7% between 18
and 44 years. 73.5% were college students or professionals
who had associates, bachelors, or higher degrees. 75.9% of
the participants claimed that they do not have a degree or
work experience in computer science or related fields. The
demographic distributions were similar between conditions
and showed a similar pattern as the main experiments.
TABLE IV: Each option selection results for high-sensitive
and low-sensitive questions in each condition of Pilot study 1.
Condition Question Sensitivity Opt Out Local Only Both
Control low-sensitive 5.1% 32.2% 62.7%high-sensitive 16.1% 45.5% 38.4%
Loss Framing low-sensitive 2.8% 37.8% 59.4%high-sensitive 17.0% 51.3% 31.7%
Opt out decision, selection for Local only option, and choice
of Both option collapsed across participants (see Table IV)
were entered into a 2 (question sensitivity: low-sensitive, high-
sensitive) × 2 (condition: Control, Loss Framing) chi-squared
tests with a significance level of .05, respectively. Post-hoc
tests with Bonferroni corrections [6] were performed, testing
all pairwise comparisons with corrected p-values for possible
inflation. We mainly report the statistics for the significant
effects. Please refer to Table VII for all statistical tests results.
Opt out rate. Participants opted out more for the high-
sensitive questions (16.5%) than for the low-sensitive ques-
tions (4.0%), χ2(1) = 120.5, p < .001. The two-way interaction
of sensitivity × condition was significant, χ2(1) = 4.66, p =
.031. Between two conditions, participants’ opt-out rates were
similar for the high-sensitive questions (Control: 16.1%, Loss
Framing: 16.9%). However, for the low-sensitive questions,
participants in the Loss Framing condition (2.8%) opted out
less than those in the Control condition (5.1%), padj = .031.
The results suggest that the loss framing made participants
think more of “product, service, or other benefits” but limited
to the low-sensitive information.
Local only selection rate. Participants selected more Local
only option for the high-sensitive questions (48.4%) than for
the low-sensitive questions (34.9%), χ2(1) = 52.55, p < .001.
The selection rates for the Loss Framing condition (44.6%)
was higher than that for the Control condition (38.8%),
χ2(1) = 9.37, p = .002. Nevertheless, the two-way interaction
of question sensitivity × condition was not significant. Thus,
participants generally preferred high-sensitive information to
be used by the app locally, and such preference was relatively
independent from the framing effect.
Both selection rate. The results were in agreement with
those of Local only selection. Participants chose more Both
option for the low-sensitive questions (61.0%) than for the
high-sensitive questions (35.1%), χ2(1) = 192.02, p < .001.
Relative to the Control (50.6%), participants in the Loss Fram-
ing selected less Both option (45.5%), χ2(1) = 6.97, p = .008.
But the main effect of question sensitivity did not interact with
condition.
Trust evaluation. Trust evaluation collapsed across partic-
ipants were entered into 2 (data use: the local app, the app
server) × 2 (condition: Control, Loss Framing) chi-squared
tests. Only the main effect of condition was significant,
χ2(1) = 4.71, p = .029. Participants in the Control showed
more trust (62.1%) than those in the Loss Framing (50.9%).
C. Discussion
In Pilot Study 1, participants showed less willingness to
share high-sensitive information than low-sensitive informa-
tion. When the loss framing was presented, participants’ data
disclosure was reduced regardless of questions’ sensitivity.
Participants opted out less for the low-sensitive questions with
the loss framing, indicating a risk seeking qualified in terms of
question sensitivity. Thus, we obtained the effect of question
sensitivity and the framing effect [3], [5], [21], confirming the
health app data collection setting and hypothetical willingness
to disclose personal information as one testbed to evaluate
privacy decisions.
APPENDIX C
PILOT STUDY 2
To make sure the two new descriptions and five comprehen-
sion questions are understandable to the participants, we con-
ducted a pilot study with 20 participants on Amazon MTurk.
Using a between-subject design, half of the participants were
randomly assigned into the DP Flow condition and the other
half into the LDP Flow condition.
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A. Participants, Stimuli, and Procedure
At the beginning of the study, we made it clear to the par-
ticipants that we were interested in (1) their understanding of
a privacy protection technique based on the given description,
and (2) whether the description is clear and the survey ques-
tions are understandable. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the descriptions. After introducing the three steps of
role play similar to prior experiments, we presented the DP
Flow or the LDP Flow description. Following the description,
participants in each condition answered five questions evaluat-
ing their comprehension of DP or LDP implications from the
perspectives of privacy and accuracy. The five questions were:
• Q1: Suppose that you have answered truthfully the questions
presented by the app, and the answers were collected using
the privacy protection technique explained earlier. If an
attacker gets access to the database of the health app
company, will the attacker be able to see your real answer?
• Q2: Suppose that you have answered truthfully the questions
presented by the app, and the answers were collected
using the privacy protection technique explained earlier. For
employees within the health app company, will they be able
to see your real answer?
• Q3: Suppose that you have answered truthfully the questions
presented by the app, and the answers were collected using
the privacy protection technique explained earlier. For the
third party companies with which the health app company
shared data, will they be able to see the real answer that
you submitted?
• Q4: With the modification from the privacy protection tech-
nique, the accuracy of summary results obtained by the
health app company will become if compared to re-
sults without the privacy protection technique (compared to
the true results [without the privacy protection technique]).
• Q5: Suppose that you shared your information, such as
your family medical history, with the health app. With the
modification from the privacy protection technique, will the
results still be useful for the third-party companies with
which the health app company share data?
The options are “Yes”, “No”, “Unsure” , or “Prefer not
to answer” except Q4, whose options are “Better”, “Worse
(correct answer for DP & LDP)”, “No change”, “Unsure”, or
“Prefer not to answer”. After each question, participants also
rated whether the question description was easy to comprehend
on the 7-point Likert Scale. For participants who gave ratings
smaller than 4, they were then asked to describe which part or
parts of the description are hard to understand and briefly ex-
plain the reasons. The five questions were presented randomly.
We also randomized the options except “Unsure” and “Prefer
not to answer” for each question. After the five questions, we
also asked participants to indicate their agreement on whether
the description of the privacy protection technique was easy
to comprehend on the 7-point Likert Scale. For ratings lower
than 4, we asked participants to describe which part or parts
of the questions are hard to understand and briefly explain
the reasons. In the end, participants answered questions about
their demographics.
B. Results
55% of the participants were female. 15% of them were
less than 24 years old. 70% of them were the ages of 25 to
44. The rest 15% were between the age of 45 to 54. 65% of
them have college or higher degrees. 35% of the participants
had a high school degree. 65% of them indicated that they did
not have a computer science background.
TABLE V: Correct answer rate and easy-to-comprehend rating
for each inference question, as well as average rating of each
description in Pilot Study 2.
Question Correct Rate
Easy-to-Comprehend
Rating
DP Flow. LDP Flow DP Flow LDP Flow
Privacy Attacker 50.0% 80.0% 6.2 5.8
Privacy Employee 60.0% 70.0% 5.6 6.4
Privacy Third Party 50.0% 90.0% 5.7 6.1
Utility Cost 0.0% 10.0% 5 5.2
Utility Third Party 90.0% 80.0% 6.1 6.1
Description NA NA 6.2 6.1
Correct answer rate of each question for both descriptions
are shown in Table V. Generally, participants could understand
and answered correctly better than the chance for all questions
except for the question of utility cost. Among 20 participants,
four of them thought Q4 (Utility Cost) was hard to under-
stand, e.g., “The initial description of the privacy protection
technique doesn’t mention anything about comparing results
with the original data, so I don’t really know the answer to
the question”, and “I’m not sure if there is really enough
information to know whether the answers will be better or
not. The explanation is very vague.” Participants believed both
descriptions and all five questions were easy to understand.
Based on the obtained results, we modified the descriptions
(see details in Table XII) and Q4 (see the bold part).
APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
We provide exclusion summary of participants for all ex-
periments in Table XI; DP and LDP descriptions proposed in
the present study and descriptions from companies are shown
in Tables XII; statistical test results of each Pilot study and
experiment in Tables VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, respectively.
TABLE VI: Statistical test results of Pilot Study 1.
Term Local Only Both Opt Out
χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p
Question Sensitivity 52.55 <.001 192.02 <.001 120.5 <.001
Condition 9.37 .002 6.97 .008 <1.0
Question Sensitivity * Condition <1.0 1.04 0.309 4.66 .031
Low-Sensitive vs. High-Sensitive
Control (Con.) N/A N/A <.001Loss Framing <.001
Low-Sensitive
Con. vs. Loss Framing N/A N/A .031
High-Sensitive
Con. vs. Loss Framing N/A N/A <1.0
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TABLE VII: Statistical test results of Experiment 1.
Term Local Only Both Opt Out
χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p
Question Sensitivity 43.38 <.001 325.65 <.001 290.0 <.001
Condition 40.31 <.001 30.31 <.001 4.95 .175
Con vs. Gain Framing <.001 .012
N/A
Con vs. DP <.001 <.001
Con vs. LDP .101 .017
Gain Framing vs. DP .380 .165
Gain Framing vs. LDP .499 >.999
DP vs. LDP <.001 .045
Question Sensitivity * Condition 21.59 <.001 22.45 <.001 3.03 .388
Low-Sensitive vs. High-Sensitive
Control <.001 <.001
N/AGain Framing <.001 <.001DP .113 <.001
LDP .113 <.001
Low-Sensitive
Con vs. Gain Framing <.001 <.001
N/A
Con vs. DP .025 .018
Con vs. LDP >.999 >.999
Gain Framing vs. DP .283 .843
Gain Framing vs. LDP .001 .013
DP vs. LDP .047 .409
High-Sensitive
Con vs. Gain Framing >.999 >.999
N/A
Con vs. DP <.001 <.001
Con vs. LDP .021 .017
Gain Framing vs. DP <.001 <.001
Gain Framing vs. LDP .557 .048
DP vs. LDP .024 .258
TABLE VIII: Statistical test results of Experiment 2A.
Term Local Only Both Opt Out
χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p
Question Sensitivity 41.54 <.001 331.56 <.001 372.68 <.001
Condition 3.88 .274 <1.0 3.91 .271
LDP w/o Names vs. DP w/o Names
N/A N/A N/A
LDP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names
LDP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp.
LDP Comp. vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names
DP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names
DP w/o names vs. LDP Comp.
Question Sensitivity * Condition 12.74 .005 9.06 .029 7.88 .048
Low-Sensitive vs. High-Sensitive
DP w/o Names .452 <.001 <.001
LDP w/o Names .019 <.001 <.001
LDP Comp. w/o Names <.001 <.001 <.001
LDP Comp. .004 <.001 <.001
Low-Sensitive
LDP w/o Names vs. DP w/o Names .850 .270 .892
LDP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names >.999 >.999 >.999
LDP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. >.999 >.999 .660
LDP Comp. vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names >.999 >.999 >.999
DP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names .356 >.999 >.999
DP w/o names vs. LDP Comp. >.999 .366 >.999
High-Sensitive
LDP w/o Names vs. DP w/o Names >.999 >.999 .681
LDP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names .014 >.999 .020
LDP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. >.999 >.999 .544
LDP Comp. vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names .208 >.999 >.999
DP w/o Names vs. LDP Comp. w/o Names .017 >.999 >.999
DP w/o names vs. LDP Comp. >.999 .248 >.999
TABLE IX: Statistical test results of Experiment 2B.
Term Local Only Both Opt Out
χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p
Question Sensitivity 22.58 <.001 206.02 <.001 229.49 <.001
Condition 12.36 .002 29.2 <.001 10.77 .005
LDP Imp. vs. DP Imp. .049 <.001 .026
LDP Imp. vs. LDP Imp. w/o Local >.999 >.999 >.999
DP Imp. vs. LDP Imp. w/o Local .002 <.001 .012
Question Sensitivity * Condition <1.0 1.36 .508 3.61 .164
Low-Sensitive vs. High-Sensitive
DP Imp.
N/A N/A N/ALDP Imp.
LDP Imp. w/o Local
Low-Sensitive
LDP Imp. vs. DP Imp.
N/A N/A N/ALDP Imp. vs. LDP Imp. w/o Local
DP Imp.vs. LDP Imp. w/o Local
High-Sensitive
LDP Imp. vs. DP Imp.
N/A N/A N/ALDP Imp. vs. LDP Imp. w/o Local
DP Imp. vs. LDP Imp. w/o Local
TABLE X: Statistical test results of Experiment 4.
Question Term χ2 p
Q1. Privacy Attackers
Technique 9.49 .002
Description 102.3 <.001
w/o Names vs. Imp. <.001
w/o Names vs. Flow <.001
Imp. Vs. Flow .002
Technique * Description 15.91 <.001
DP vs. LDP
w/o Names .004
Imp. .107
Flow .001
Q2. Privacy Employees
Technique 4.09 .043
Description 45.6 <.001
w/o Names vs. Imp. .042
w/o Names vs. Flow <.001
Imp. vs. Flow .001
Technique * Description 10.77 .005
DP vs. LDP
w/o Names >.999
Imp. >.999
Flow .001
Q3. Privacy Third party
Technique <1.0
Description 24.77 <.001
w/o Names vs. Imp. .272
w/o Names vs. Flow <.001
Imp. Vs. Flow .006
Technique * Description 12.66 .002
DP vs. LDP
w/o Names .032
Imp. .926
Flow .040
Q4. Utility Cost
Technique <1.0
Description 56.33 <.001
w/o Names vs. Imp. .274
w/o Names vs. Flow <.001
Imp. Vs. Flow <.001
Technique * Description 2.02 .365
DP vs. LDP
w/o Names NA
Imp. NA
Flow NA
Q5. Utility Third party
Technique 4.07 .044
Description 37.32 <.001
w/o Names vs. Imp. .115
w/o Names vs. Flow <.001
Imp. vs. Flow .001
Technique * Description 8.96 .011
DP vs. LDP
w/o Names .666
Imp. .002
Flow .605
TABLE XI: Summary of participants who were excluded from
data analysis for all experiments. The number of participants before
exclusion in each experiment is listed in the first column.
EXP.
Median
Complete
Time (sec)
Payment
($)
Same
IP
Time
<
120 sec
2nd Check Question
Failure
Condition Count
Pilot 1
(219) 264
1
4 11 N/A
EXP. 1
(598) 289 12 28
DP 42
LDP 51
EXP. 2A
(781) 328 15 19
DP w/o Names 58
LDP w/o Names 46
LDP Comp. w/o Names 30
LDP Comp. 32
EXP. 2B
(600) 303 9 15
DP Imp. 28
LDP Imp. 43
LDP Imp. w/o Local 37
EXP. 3
(279) 192 0.75 1 N/A N/A
Pilot 2
(20) 303 1 0 0 N/A
EXP. 4
(599) 245 7 52 N/A
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TABLE XII: Proposed descriptions of DP and LDP techniques of each condition in each experiment. Descriptions of DP w/o
Names, LDP w/o Names, and LDP Comp. w/o Names are the same as DP, LDP, and LDP Comp., respectively, except the last
sentences in square brackets are deleted. DP Flow and LDP Flow are updated based on results of Pilot Study 2 (in bold font).
Condition Description
DP
To respect your personal information privacy and ensure best user experience, the data shared with
the app will be processed via the differential privacy (DP) technique. DP protects users’ privacy by
adding random noise to aggregated data, for example, average age, such that the probability that an
individual’s information is inferred is low. [DP has been used across academia and industry,
including Harvard University, U.S. Census Bureau, and companies such as LinkedIn and Uber.]
LDP
To respect your personal information privacy and ensure best user experience, the data shared with
the app will be collected via the local differential privacy (LDP) technique. LDP protects users’
privacy by adding random noise to each response that users give such that the probability that any
user’s attribute is inferred is similar as he or she is opt-out for the data collection. [LDP has been
used by companies such as Google and Apple.]
LDP Comp
To respect your personal information privacy and ensure best user experience, the data shared with
the app will be collected via the local differential privacy (LDP) technique. LDP protects your
privacy by adding random noise to the raw data locally BEFORE you give the data to the company
(raw data never leaves your device). [LDP has been used by companies such as Google and Apple.]
DP Imp.
To respect your personal information privacy and ensure best user experience, the data shared with
the app will be processed via the differential privacy (DP) technique. That is, the app company will
store your data but only use the aggregated statistics with modification so that your personal
information cannot be learned. However, your personal information may be leaked if the company’s
database is compromised.
LDP Imp.
To respect your personal information privacy and ensure best user experience, the data shared with
the app will be processed via the local differential privacy (LDP) technique. That is, the app
will randomly modify your data on your cellphone before sending it to the app server. Since the
app server stores only the modified version of your personal information, your privacy is protected
even if the app server’s database is compromised.
LDP Imp.
w/o Local
To respect your personal information privacy and ensure best user experience, the data shared with
the app will be processed via the differential privacy (DP) technique. That is, the app will
randomly modify your data on your cellphone before sending it to the app server. Since the app
server stores only the modified version of your personal information, your privacy is protected even
if the app server’s database is compromised.
DP Flow
When differential privacy (DP) is used, the app sends the user’s answers to the company. These
answers are then stored in the company’s databases. When the company wants to use the collected
data, either internally or for sharing with third-party companies, the company sends queries to the
databases, applies DP techniques to modify the returned results, and uses only the modified results.
These modified results reveal limited information specific to each individual user. However, by
examining the modified answers of a large number of users, the company can still get useful
summary results in the user population, even though the accuracy is reduced (compared to the
case when no modification is applied).
LDP Flow
When local differential privacy (LDP) is used, the app modifies the answers before sending them
from the user’s device to the company. The company only sees and stores the modified version of
each user’s information, and is uncertain about each individual user’s true answer. However, by
examining the modified answers of a large number of users, the company can still get useful
summary results in the user population, even though the accuracy is reduced (compared to the
case when no modification is applied).
Apple
Differential privacy transforms the information shared with the company before it ever leaves the
user’s device such that the company can never reproduce the true data. The differential privacy
technology used is rooted in the idea that statistical noise that is slightly biased can mask a user’s
individual data before it is shared with the company. If many people are submitting the same data,
the noise that has been added can average out over large numbers of data points, and the company
can see meaningful information emerge.
Google
Building on the concept of randomized response, local differential privacy (LDP) enables learning
statistics about the behavior of users’ software while guaranteeing client privacy. LDP builds on the
above concept, allowing software to send reports that are effectively indistinguishable from the
results of random coin flips and are free of any unique identifiers. However, by aggregating the
reports we can learn the common statistics that are shared by many users.
Microsoft
Differential privacy is a technology that enables researchers and analysts to extract useful answers
from databases containing personal information and, at the same time, offers strong individual
privacy protections. This seemingly contradictory outcome is achieved by introducing relatively
small inaccuracies in the answers provided by the system. These inaccuracies are large enough that
they protect privacy, but small enough that the answers provided to analysts and researchers are still
useful.
Uber
Differential privacy is a formal definition of privacy and is widely recognized by industry experts
as providing strong and robust privacy assurances for individuals. In short, differential privacy allows
general statistical analysis without revealing information about a particular individual in the data.
Results do not even reveal whether any individual appears in the data. For this reason, differential
privacy provides an extra layer of protection against re-identification attacks as well as attacks using
auxiliary data.
US
Census Bureau
Differential privacy was developed by researchers at Microsoft and is now utilized by many leading
tech firms. There are many variants of differential privacy. The one we selected introduces controlled
noise into the data in a manner that preserves the accuracy at higher levels of geography. Our
differential privacy methods will be designed to preserve the utility of our legally mandated data
products while also ensuring that every respondents’ personal information is fully protected.
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